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ABSTRACT
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has declared that “Prior
decisions of this Court are consistent with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Endrew F.,” the 2017 Supreme Court case interpreting the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act obligation to furnish
students with disabilities free, appropriate public education. This
Essay considers whether that statement is accurate, and concludes that
while some of the past Second Circuit decisions fit comfortably with
Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas County School District RE-1,
others do not. The Essay submits that the court of appeals should
confess a lack of clairvoyance in its earlier decisions and forthrightly
overrule or limit those cases that are not consistent with the
interpretation of the appropriate education duty found in Endrew F.
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INTRODUCTION
Ambrose Bierce defined a clairvoyant as someone “who has
the power of seeing that which is invisible to her patron, namely, that
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he is a blockhead.”1 In the wake of Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v.
Douglas County School District RE-1,2 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals declared that its previous caselaw anticipated the legal
development that the Endrew F. decision represented, and thus its
earlier decisions continue to be reliable guides to the meaning of free,
appropriate public education.3 Whether those earlier cases actually are
consistent with Endrew F.’s approach is the question this Essay tries
to address. Was the Second Circuit clairvoyant in foreseeing Endrew
F.’s interpretation of the appropriate education obligation, or should
litigants and observers fear they are being taken for blockheads?
The answer is mixed. A number of Second Circuit cases,
including recent and prominent ones, employ language about
appropriate education that is similar to what the Supreme Court
rejected in Endrew F. and reach outcomes that could well come out
differently under Endrew F.’s interpretation of the law.4 Nevertheless,
other cases of the court of appeals appear to interpret appropriate
education consistently with Endrew F. or at least to reach conclusions
on the facts of the cases that Endrew F. would support.5 This Essay
suggests that the court of appeals and district courts in the Second
Circuit should acknowledge the inconsistency of those former cases
with Endrew F. and overrule them or restrict their application. At the
very least, the court of appeals should not make a blanket assertion that
the cases are all reliable precedent.
The list of cases applying Endrew F. is still fairly modest, and
the commentary on the case remains of manageable scope. 6 Only a
few sources have begun to collect and analyze the case’s sequels.7 This
* Vincent de Paul Professor, DePaul University College of Law.
1 AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL’S DICTIONARY 16-17 (Dover Publ’ns. 1993) (1911).
2 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017).
3 Mr. P v. W. Hartford Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 735 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct.
322 (2018).
4 See infra text accompanying notes 41-53.
5 See infra text accompanying notes 54-59.
6 See, e.g., Endrew F. and Fry Symposium, The Special Education Cases of 2017, 46 J.L.
& EDUC. 425 (2017). Some commentary focuses on specific aspects of appropriate education
or specific educational settings. See, e.g., Maliha Ikram, When Local Governments Waiver:
Giving Bite to Students With Disabilities’ Federal Right to Avail Physical Education, 15
RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 345, 358-63 (2018); David Dante Troutt, Trapped in Tragedies:
Childhood Trauma, Spatial Inequality, and Law, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 601, 639-42 (2018);
Michael A. Naclerio, Note, Accountability Through Procedure? Rethinking Charter School
Accountability and Special Education Rights, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1166-69 (2017).
7 See, e.g., Maureen A. MacFarlane, In Search of the Meaning of an “Appropriate
Education”: Ponderings on the Fry and Endrew Decisions, 46 J.L. & EDUC. 539, 548 & n.56,
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Essay seeks to add to the literature by critiquing the effort of the
Second Circuit in Mr. P to harmonize previous caselaw with Endrew
F.
Part I of this Essay describes Endrew F. and its impact on
existing caselaw regarding the duty to provide appropriate education.
Part II discusses Mr. P v. West Hartford Board of Education, the
Second Circuit case that declares that prior circuit precedent is
consistent with Endrew F., and considers its basis for drawing that
conclusion. Part III lists and discusses a number of Second Circuit
cases that embody approaches at odds with Endrew F., as well as a few
that might accurately be said to anticipate the Supreme Court decision.
It argues that the Second Circuit should evaluate its prior cases
carefully and individually, and overrule, limit, or, if justified, reaffirm
them in light of Endrew F., rather than issuing a blanket statement of
approval.
I.

ENDREW F.

In Endrew F., the parents of Drew, a child with autism, argued
that the program he was offered did not satisfy the school district’s
obligation under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(hereinafter “IDEA”)8 to provide free, appropriate public education.9
Drew had significant behavioral problems when he was in school. He
screamed, he climbed over furniture and other students, he displayed
irrational fears, and he occasionally ran from the classroom.10 Drew’s
553-57 (2017); see also Patricia E. Kefalas Dudek, Endrew F. v. Douglas County School
District RE-1, 14 NAELA J. 73 (2018) (discussing three court of appeals cases). Professor
Zirkel has studied outcomes of a total of 49 court cases with substantive appropriate education
holdings in which administrative decision makers relied on pre-Endrew F. caselaw and the
court addressed the issue applying Endrew F. He found that the administrative outcome was
unchanged in 90% of the court decisions, though he noted that 7 of the 44 outcomes that did
not change were in favor of the parent. Perry A. Zirkel, The Aftermath of Endrew F. One Year
Later: An Updated Outcomes Analysis, 352 EDUC. L. REP. 448, 450 (2018). Endrew F. may
currently be having a significant impact at the administrative level. In Illinois in the postEndrew F. period, the fraction of due process cases decided in favor of parents on at least one
significant issue appears quite high, see Due Process Decisions, ILL. ST. BOARD EDUC.,
https://sec1.isbe.net/sedsinquiry/dueprocessdecisions.aspx (last visited Dec. 20, 2018),
compared to the historical rate of about 20-40% in various states that were surveyed in the
years before Endrew F., see Mark C. Weber, In Defense of IDEA Due Process, 29 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 495, 509-10 (2014) (collecting studies).
8 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2012 & Supp. IV 2016).
9 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 997 (2017).
10 Id. at 996.
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parents felt that his educational progress had plateaued, and the school
reinforced that impression by offering a fifth grade individualized
educational program (hereinafter “IEP”) for him that carried over
objectives and goals from previous years.11 The parents contested the
program in an administrative due process hearing and unilaterally
placed Drew at a private program. The private school, Firefly Autism
House, developed a behavioral intervention plan for Drew and wrote
more demanding academic goals for him. Within months, his behavior
improved and he made academic progress he had not achieved
before.12 The public school proposed another revised program, which
the parents again contested. In the culmination of the proceedings, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the public school’s program
offered Drew a free, appropriate public education.13 The court
evaluated the program under the standard that “the educational benefit
mandated by IDEA must merely be ‘more than de minimis.’”14
The Supreme Court responded by vacating and remanding.
The unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Roberts pointed out that the
Court’s previous decision on the meaning of appropriate education,
Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v.
Rowley,15 did not produce a single test for the adequacy of educational
programs under the IDEA. Rather, it embodied “a general approach:
To meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer
an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress
appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”16 The Court said
Rowley established that for a child who is fully integrated in the regular
classroom, an IEP typically should permit the student to achieve
passing marks and advance from grade to grade, although not every
child who advances from grade to grade necessarily receives
appropriate education in satisfaction of the law.17 But whether a child
is fully integrated or not, each student must be offered an educational
program that is “appropriately ambitious in light of [the child’s]
circumstances . . . . [E]very child should have the chance to meet
11

Id.
Id. at 996-97.
13 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 798 F.3d 1329 (10th Cir.
2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017).
14 Id. at 1338 (quoting Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1149 (10th
Cir. 2008)).
15 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
16 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999.
17 Id. at 1000 & n.2.
12
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challenging objectives.”18 The Court declared that this standard for
appropriate education is “markedly more demanding than the ‘merely
more than de minimis’ test applied by the Tenth Circuit.”19 After
further litigation, the case returned to the district court, which decided
in favor of the parents.20 Press reports indicate that the case settled on
appeal.21
Endrew F. did not overrule Rowley, so it kept current Supreme
Court caselaw intact. But Rowley is the only previous Supreme Court
case to consider the content of appropriate education, so there was not
much to disturb. With regard to lower court decisions, Endrew F.
made clear that an interpretation of Rowley, and of appropriate
education, that imposes only minimal obligations is wrong. Language
like “merely more than de minimis benefit” is no longer an accurate
description of the appropriate education standard. Instead, at the least,
the program has to be appropriately ambitious and feature challenging
objectives, a markedly more demanding standard.
II.

ENDREW F. MEETS MR. P

Mr. P v. West Hartford Board of Education involved a high
school student with high functioning autism spectrum disorderAsperger’s Syndrome, nonverbal learning disabilities, and psychotic
disorder.22 The student, who previously had done well in school, was
receiving grades of D in all his classes in the December of his
sophomore year.23 A brief hospitalization revealed that he manifested
suicidal and homicidal thoughts, which led to his diagnosis.24 The
18

Id. at 1000.
Id. The Court went on to reaffirm Rowley’s rejection of the claim that all children must
be offered an opportunity to achieve academic success, attain self-sufficiency, and make
societal contributions substantially equal to the opportunity afforded children without
disabilities. The Court stressed the importance of deferring to the expertise and judgment of
school authorities, but further declared that “a reviewing court may fairly expect those
authorities to be able to offer a cogent and responsive explanation for their decisions that
shows the IEP is reasonably calculated to enable the child to make progress appropriate in
light of his circumstances.” Id. at 1001-02.
20 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE 1, 290 F. Supp. 3d 1175 (D.
Colo. 2018), appeal dismissed, No. 18-1089, 2018 WL 4360885 (10th Cir. Apr. 5, 2018).
21
E.g., Anne Schimke, Douglas County District Pays $1.3 Million to Settle Landmark
Special Education Case, DENVER POST (June 20, 2018, 6:25 PM), https://www.denverpost.co
m/2018/06/20/douglas-county-district-special-education-case/.
22 885 F.3d 735 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 322 (2018).
23 Id. at 742.
24 Id. at 740.
19
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school did not initiate a special education evaluation under the IDEA,
but in January approved accommodations, including counseling,
pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.25 The student
stopped attending school in February and received tutoring at home.26
His parents requested special education for him in March and he was
hospitalized again in April.27 After an evaluation, the school district
found him eligible in June and developed a special education program
for his junior and senior years.28 The school placed him in an
alternative high school program called STRIVE, which featured datadriven behavior management in addition to coursework geared to the
school’s graduation requirements.29 His grades in the program were
generally good, though he had attendance problems and one physical
altercation with a classmate.30 He graduated on time, but a dispute
developed over post-secondary services and the parents eventually
contested the school’s treatment of the student from the beginning of
sophomore year through the school’s rejection of the post-secondary
services requested by the parents.31 The parents sought compensatory
education and prospective relief. The school prevailed on all but a
minor issue at the administrative and district court levels,32 and the
court of appeals affirmed.
There was a significant dispute in the case regarding the timing
and adequacy of the student’s evaluation for special education
eligibility. But as relevant to this Essay, the key issue was the
substantive adequacy of the programs the public school offered the
student. The court of appeals agreed that the programs provided
appropriate education, stressing that the alternative high school
program enabled the student to pass from junior to senior year and
achieve As and Bs, which permitted him to meet graduation
requirements and make progress as to his behavior.33 The homebound
tutoring was not adequate at first, but the school offered compensatory
tutoring hours during the summer.34 Though the parents argued that
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012).
Mr. P, 885 F.3d at 743.
Id.
Id. at 740.
Id. at 744.
Id. at 745.
Id. at 746-47.
The issue concerned transportation to the post-secondary program. Id. at 747.
Id. at 757-58.
Id.
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their proposed post-secondary program was superior to that of the
school district, the court said that was not the relevant question and
that with a modification as to transportation the school’s program was
sufficient to provide appropriate education.35
The court of appeals stated that “[p]rior decisions of this Court
are consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Endrew F.”36
relying solely on the 1998 decision Walczak v. Florida Union Free
School District, which declared, “Plainly, . . . the door of public
education must be opened for a disabled child in a ‘meaningful’ way.
This is not done if an IEP affords the opportunity for only ‘trivial
advancement.’”37 In a note, the court distinguished Cerra v. Pauling
Central School District, which contains language very similar to that
of the Tenth Circuit opinion the Endrew F. Court vacated: “a school
district fulfills its substantive obligations under the IDEA if it provides
an IEP that is ‘likely to produce progress, not regression,’ and if the
IEP affords the student with an opportunity greater than mere ‘trivial
advancement.’”38 Mr. P noted that the state review decision that the
case upheld said that the student had made meaningful progress.39
“Thus, Cerra should not be read or cited for the proposition that
anything more than ‘mere trivial advancement’ is sufficient to satisfy
the IDEA.”40
Of course, it is possible to dispute whether the court of appeals
faithfully followed the Supreme Court’s Endrew F. in Mr. P. The
district court in that case had used a standard of likely “progress, not
regression,” and “an opportunity greater than mere trivial
advancement,” mirroring the language of the vacated Tenth Circuit
decision in Endrew F. The court of appeals in Mr. P did not go into
depth about whether the goals set for the student plaintiff were
“challenging objectives,” but relied instead on the fact that he had a
good grade point average, was promoted from tenth to eleventh grade,
and managed to graduate on time. The court never asked whether the
program was “appropriately ambitious,” nor did it discuss whether the
IEP satisfied a standard “markedly more demanding than the ‘merely
de minimis’ test.” The word “ambitious” appears nowhere in the
35
36
37
38
39
40

Id. at 759-60.
Id. at 757.
142 F.3d 119, 130 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
427 F.3d 186, 195 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130).
Mr. P, 885 F.3d at 757 n.12.
Id.
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opinion. But the fact remains that the student did do well under the
school’s program by a number of measures.
III.

PRESCIENT OR OBSTINANT?

Of greater importance for future cases, however, is the court’s
assertion that not only Mr. P but also Walczak and the whole catalogue
of older Second Circuit decisions anticipated Endrew F.’s view of
appropriate education. Here skepticism is in order. Walczak
overturned a ruling by Judge Brieant that had rejected the school
district’s placement of a child in a “developmentally disabled”
intermediate program that was the continuation of the program from
which she was aging out.41 Judge Brieant agreed with the parent that
the program was not adequate to provide appropriate education, and
found the parent’s unilateral placement of the child at a private,
residential school justified.
Reversing, the court of appeals
emphasized the learning the child had achieved in the public program.
The court noted, but did not put any emphasis on, the social
advancement that the child made in a year at the private placement:
“B.W. began to establish friendships with other children and to
participate in group activities. Dr. Liss reported that B.W.’s ‘living
skills’ had also improved from the level of a five-year old to those of
a nine-year old.”42 The huge improvement in appropriate behavior that
the child made looks very similar to that made by Drew when his
parents put him in a specialized private placement. It is an open
question whether the goals set for the child in Walczak were
“appropriately ambitious” and whether she would continue to make
progress such that her program in the public school would be
“markedly more demanding” than one that would provide for more
than merely trivial advancement. The court of appeals resolved doubts
about whether the education was appropriate by deferring to the
administrative decision makers, but there was no discussion of what
standards they applied, and of course neither they nor the court had any
reason to anticipate Endrew F.’s reading of the law.
A sampling of other Second Circuit decisions reveals several
whose consistency with Endrew F. is questionable. Consider, for
example, T.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free School District, which took

41
42

Walczak, 142 F.3d at 121.
Id. at 128.
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the “an opportunity greater than mere trivial advancement” standard
from Cerra and overturned a district court determination that the
program proposed for the child was inadequate for failure to provide
in-home Applied Behavioral Analysis as the child made the transition
into kindergarten.43 The court noted that the program offered ten hours
of in-school Applied Behavioral Analysis (down from 30-35 hours that
the child previously received), and the court relied, perhaps
implausibly, on an administrative finding that the child’s biting and
off-topic recitation of language picked up from television shows did
not interfere with his learning.44 Although the child’s biting behavior
eventually ceased, it is an open question whether that was enough of
an appropriately ambitious goal.
In A.C. v. Board of Education of the Chappaqua Central
School District, the Second Circuit also relied on Cerra’s language
about greater than merely trivial advancement and reversed the holding
of the district court that the child’s program was insufficient. 45 There
was a significant dispute over whether and to what extent the child was
making progress in the public school program. The impartial hearing
officer and the district court took one position but the state review
officer, and ultimately the court of appeals, took the other. 46 No
adjudicator was tasked with asking if the progress was markedly more
demanding than what a “merely more than de minimis” standard would
require, and the quotation of Cerra’s language parallel to the Tenth
Circuit language in Endrew F. casts doubt whether the program met
Endrew F.’s standard for appropriate education.
Grim v. Rhinebeck Central School District upheld a public
school IEP that did not guarantee the provision of Orton-Gillingham
reading instruction, which the trial court had said was the only method
supported by the record for educating the dyslexic child who was the
subject of the suit.47 Citing Walczak, the Second Circuit said the sole
question on the substantive appropriateness of the IEP was whether the
child was “likely to make progress or regress under the proposed
plan.”48 Both on the facts and on the language, the case is closer to the

43
44
45
46
47
48

554 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2009).
Id. at 254.
553 F.3d 165, 173 (2d Cir. 2009).
Id.
346 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 2003).
Id. at 383 (quoting Walczak v. Fla. Union Free. Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 130 (1998)).
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court of appeals decision in Endrew F. than that of the Supreme
Court.49
Reaching back to the period before the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act was retitled the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, the prominent case50 Karl ex rel. Karl v.
Board of Education of the Geneseo Central School District overturned
a district court order that a student with intellectual disability be
offered a more favorable teacher-student ratio in a vocational
program.51 The court simply asked whether the student’s program as
a whole was reasonably calculated to confer educational benefit,52
without any consideration of whether it was appropriately ambitious in
light of the student’s circumstances or whether its goals were
challenging. The dissent felt that the vocational program did not meet
even the educational-benefit standard in light of the teacher-student
ratio that was offered.53 The standard the court applied, being drawn
49 Some Second Circuit cases that principally involve issues other than appropriate
education also contain language regarding appropriate education dubiously compatible with
Endrew F. See M.W. ex rel. S.W. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 725 F.3d 131, 143 (2d Cir. 2013)
(“[T]he ‘IEP must provide the opportunity for more than only “trivial advancement.”’”
(quoting P. ex rel. Mr. and Mrs. P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir.
2008))).
50 Karl was cited as recently as March 17, 2017, five days before Endrew F. came down.
J.B. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 242 F. Supp. 3d 186, 199 (E.D.N.Y. 2017).
51 736 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1984).
52
Id. at 877-78.
53 Id. at 878 (Pratt, J., dissenting). Nonprecedential Second Circuit cases (even one decided
after Endrew F.) and cases from district courts within the Second Circuit are also doubtfully
consistent with the Supreme Court decision, in light of the similarity between the Tenth
Circuit’s standard of “merely more than de minimis” and the Second Circuit cases’ variations
on more than only trivial progress. The cases are not necessarily wrongly decided on their
facts, but should be examined carefully for consistency with Endrew F. if a court is
contemplating relying on them. See, e.g., R.B. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 689 F. App’x 48, 51
(2d Cir. 2017) (interpreting Endrew F. to mean that “the IEP need not bring the child to gradelevel achievement, but it must aspire to provide more than de minimis educational progress”);
D.A.B. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 630 F. App’x 73, 78 (2d Cir. 2015) (applying standard of
“likely to produce progress and not regression”); F.L. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Great Neck
U.F.S.D., 274 F. Supp. 3d 94, 119 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (“Therefore, a school district satisfies its
obligations arising under the IDEA ‘if it provides an IEP that is likely to produce progress, not
regression, and if the IEP affords the student with an opportunity greater than mere trivial
advancement.’” (quoting M.P.G. ex rel. J.P. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 08 Civ. 8051, 2010
WL 3398256, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010)), aff’d, 735 F. App’x 38 (2d Cir. 2018); A.G.
v. Bd. of Educ. of the Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 16 CV 1530, 2017 WL 1200906, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2017) (stating that in district program student “did make progress both in
decoding and in reading during the 2013-2014 school year and that his progress was not
trivial”); Y.D. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 14 CV 1137-LTS, 2017 WL 1051129, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2017) (finding that IEP met standard of “likely to produce progress, not
regression,” and must afford the student “an opportunity greater than mere trivial
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from Rowley, was not rendered unsound by Endrew F., which
reaffirmed Rowley as precedent. Nevertheless, Endrew F. added a
gloss to the language that affects application of the Rowley standard
going forward and does not match the approach used in Karl.
All this is not to deny that some Second Circuit cases
effectively anticipated Endrew F.’s approach or otherwise may be
correct on their facts under Endrew F. For example, A.M. v. New York
City Department of Education applied a standard of whether the
department’s proposed program was reasonably calculated to confer
educational benefits, and determined that a lack of one-on-one Applied
Behavioral Analysis therapy rendered it substantively inadequate.54
Similarly, in R.E. v. New York City Department of Education, the court
applied the unelaborated “reasonably calculated to create educational
benefit” standard and found a denial of appropriate education in one of
the three cases before it and no denial in two others, stressing in each
case the evidence about the individual needs of the children.55 In M.H.
v. New York City Department of Education, the court referenced the
educational-benefit standard and other language from Rowley, and
found that one of the two children in the cases before the court was not
offered appropriate education for failure to offer the child intensive
one-on-one instruction.56 The court rejected the claim concerning the
other child largely on the basis of witness credibility. 57 In contrast to
these cases decided in favor of the parents’ position, T.Y. v. New York
City Department of Education ruled against the parents’ claim.58
Nevertheless, it appears consistent with Endrew F. in that it relied on
the fact that the public school’s offer of a one-on-one aide provided
advancement”), appeal dismissed, No. 17-1150 (2d Cir. Oct. 23, 2017); D.B. v. Ithaca City
Sch. Dist., No. 5:14-CV-01520, 2016 WL 4768824 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2016) (applying
standard of opportunity for greater than mere trivial advancement), aff’d, 690 F. App’x 778
(2d Cir. 2017).
54 845 F.3d 523, 541 (2d Cir. 2017); see also Reyes ex rel. R.P. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.,
760 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding that proposed program with only temporary provision of
one-on-one services failed to offer appropriate education, applying standard of whether
program was likely to provide progress, not regression).
55 694 F.3d 167, 194 (2d Cir. 2012).
56 685 F.3d 217, 242, 252 (2d Cir. 2012).
57 See id. at 258. Another example of a case foreshadowing Endrew F., Mrs. B. ex rel. M.M.
v. Milford Board of Education, 103 F.3d 1114 (2d Cir. 1997), rejected the school district’s
proposed program for a child with a learning disability and other conditions, and endorsed the
parent’s unilateral residential placement of a child; departing from a standard of trivial
advancement, the court emphasized that the private placement was needed for the child to
make “meaningful progress.” Id. at 1121.
58 584 F.3d 412 (2d Cir. 2009).

602

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35

“significant benefits” to the child with regard to behaviors that
interfered with his learning.59
***
Both intellectual honesty and the duty of providing accurate
guidance to lower courts require a court of appeals to review its
previous cases carefully when the Supreme Court adopts an
interpretation that is at odds with the interpretations the court applied
in the past. Mr. P’s discussion of Cerra, though it did not overrule the
case, at least earned Cerra a yellow flag on Westlaw. Judges and
litigants are entitled to the warning that other Second Circuit cases are
not necessarily consistent with Endrew F. They should not be given
an unconsidered assurance that existing precedent remains intact. In
contrast to the Second Circuit’s decision in Mr. P, the Fourth Circuit
acknowledged the likelihood of conflicts between extant circuit
caselaw and the Supreme Court decision in Endrew F.60 That step put
litigants and judges on notice of the danger of relying on pre-Endrew
F. cases.
CONCLUSION
The temptation to validate one’s past work as times change is
perfectly natural, whether one is a scholar, an artist, or a judge. But a
hasty reaffirmance of what has gone before provides poor counsel to
those who must render decisions in the future. The development of the
law that occurred in Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas County
School District RE-1 demands careful and individual consideration of
existing precedent concerning the duty to provide appropriate
education. The opinion writers of the past were not clairvoyants. They

59

Id. at 419.
See M.L. ex rel. Leiman v. Smith, 867 F.3d 487, 496 (4th Cir. 2017) (“Our prior FAPE
standard is similar to that of the Tenth Circuit, which was overturned by Endrew F.”), cert.
denied, 138 S. Ct. 752 (2018). But see E.F. ex rel. Fulsang v. Newport Mesa Unified Sch.
Dist., 726 F. App’x 535, 537 (9th Cir. 2018) (stating that Ninth Circuit’s previous appropriate
education “standard comports with Endrew’s clarification of Rowley”); C.G. ex rel. Keith G.
v. Waller Indep. Sch. Dist., 697 F. App’x 816, 819 (5th Cir. 2017) (declaring that CypressFairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F., 118 F.3d 245, 253 (5th Cir. 1997), is consistent with
Endrew F.’s interpretation of appropriate education). The Ninth Circuit’s position is alarming,
not the least because prior circuit caselaw on appropriate education is internally contradictory.
Compare N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary Sch. Dist., 541 F.3d 1202, 1213 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating
that Rowley standard has been effectively superseded by heightened “meaningful benefit”
standard), with J.L. v. Mercer Island Sch. Dist., 592 F.3d 938, 951 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding
Rowley standard not superseded and proper standard to be that of “educational benefit”).
60
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were judges working in good faith but in the absence of all but a single
Supreme Court opinion that considered a single set of facts half a
lifetime ago.

